AppLovin (NASDAQ: APP)




Company Overview

Business

- Ad Exchange: online marketplace where publishers make ad inventory available while brands/ad agencies bid on and purchase it
 - Demand-Side Platform (DSP): aggregates ad inventory from several exchanges in one place, allowing for greater efficiency for marketers
 - Sell-Side Platform (SSP): allows publishers to sell ad inventory across different exchanges
 - Data Management Platform: allows brands to store relevant data in one place to use whenever they run an ad campaign

Price Summary



APP Stock Chart (down 90.38% from its high in Nov '21)

Leadership


- Adam Foroughi (CEO, Co-Founder)
- Herald Chen (President, CFO)
- Andrew Karam (VP of New Initiatives, Co-Founder)

The company is currently founder-led and much of the shares are owned by the leadership, hence enabling them to align shareholder and management incentives

Company Overview (Cont.)

Customer Base

- APP develops and owns 350 free-to-play (F2P) mobile games across 19 studios and 5 genres
 - 200 million monthly active users (MAU)
 - 3 million monthly active in-app payers
 - #1 in downloads for all mobile game developers in 2021
- Generates revenue through in-app purchases and advertising to users on these platforms




Revenue Breakdown

Industry Overview

Products

- Ad Exchange: online marketplace where publishers make ad inventory available while brands/ad agencies bid on and purchase it
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Main Players



Market Share (Mobile Gaming Ad Tech)

Industry Trends

Reliance on First Party Data

Expanding Popularity of Immersive Ads

• Introduction of shoppable video ads, livestream ads, and mobile game ads foster realtime connection

Forecasts of digital video consumption surpassing TV viewing time by 2026¹

Shift from Console to Mobile

• Smartphone games currently account for 45% of global video gaming revenue

• Increasingly relevant following the announcement of Apple's App

Tracking Transparency (ATT) rule in early '21

 With smartphone penetration is continuing its steady growth, mobile games revenue is expected to surpass \$100bn by 2023²

Gaming Spending

1. Statista, "Average daily time spent with video content among adults in the United States from 2019 to 2026, by device"

٠

2. Statista, "Mobile gaming market in the United States - Statistics & Facts"

Investment Thesis



Investment Thesis Summary

APP collects data from its >200mn mobile game users that feeds quality first-party data to its ٠ Quality Data Advantage recommendation algorithms APP's software stack is uniquely integrated at scale, thus providing a competitive advantage against • Unique Application Ecosystem competitors Market overreaction to macroeconomic and industry headwinds do not reflect APP's intrinsic ٠ Market Overreaction values Software revenue (65% margins) will be a majority of total revenue in the future instead of apps ٠ Margin Expansion revenue (14% margins)

APP is trading at 2.2x EV/Revenue and 5.9x EV/EBITDA while competitors are trading at 3.4x and 13.9x median respectively, indicating the market currently views it as an inferior player in the space. We believe that as a leader in the industry with multiple growth runways, the company is significantly undervalued compared to its competitors' valuations as well as based on APP's own potential future cash flows.

Thesis Point 1: Competitive Advantage of Data



APP has an advantage due to its niche data and product offering compared to larger competitors

- APP collects data from user behavior directly from their 300+ mobile games and >200mn users
 - APP's DSP (MAX) and SSP (AppDiscovery) have also scaled significantly, increasing the number of data points
- All these sources are directly related to APP's advertising as their recommendation algorithms are built and trained on this data
- In particular, APP's data is related to mobile games. They can build their models off this quality data, creating a "content fortress"
- Quality data is so sought after that DSPs like Google, Snapchat, and LinkedIn purchase this data from APP









() theTradeDesk

Advantaged Machine Learning Models

APP has been able to build recommendation algorithms of significantly higher quality than competitors


- First-Party Data: Collected by companies through a direct relationship with consumers
 - For example, when someone plays a mobile game, APP is able to collect data on their play style, risk tolerance, and in-app purchases
- Machine learning models are built off the amount and quality of data³
 - More data means lower variation in estimates
 - Higher-quality data is used to build more predictive inputs into the model, hence improving the machine model's efficacy
 - Low-quality data, even in large sums, leads to poor predictive models
 - Better recommendation models means better ad conversion rates, leading to customer satisfaction, higher NRR for APP, and improved cash flow

App Tracking Transparency

APP is in a defensive position to handle changes in recent regulations due to its quantity of first-party data from its 350+ mobile applications

- Apple's introduction of ATT furthered this competitive discrepancy through limitations of third-party data
 - Third-party Data: Comes from sources not directly related to app or website usage
 - For example, the cookies that Google uses to track someone across multiple websites
- In 2021, Apple introduced a new policy (ATT) which limited the collection/access of thirdparty data by asking individuals for their consent on being tracked
 - 62% of users refuse to allow third-party data
 - This hurt advertisers as they could no longer rely on third-party data to optimize recommendation algorithms, leading to worse targeting, lower ROI and decreased spending for advertisers

- ATT has pushed the reliance to data being generated on-platform
- Mobile game focused ad tech companies (Non) are taking significant market share in the mobile advertising space from general advertisers like Meta and Google (SAN) since ATT



Thesis Point 2: Unique Application Ecosystem



Flywheel Effect of Product Offering

Improved recommendations increases ROI for both demand and sell side products

- Unique integration of first-party data and the data from developers on its demand-side platforms (DSPs)
- The integration of the different data forms improves the quality of inputs and continuously improves the recommendation algorithms
 - Will continue to improve as the DSP scales
 - Creates the "flywheel" effect



Scale Advantage

Data Quality Advantage

- APP's portfolio of 200+ mobile games is wider than other players in the space such as Zynga
- This strategy allows for collection of data across more genres while also minimizing APP's dependence on a few titles
- APP was the #3 source of iOS app installs in Jan behind Google & Meta, but ahead of competitors Unity & ironSource⁵

Data Integration

- APP has the more users on apps than other competitors.
 - Its DSP is also more scaled than competitors like Zynga and Digital Turbine.
- This larger integrated scale of first-party data as well as scale of ad tech software enables APP to have an advantage over other players in the space
- While other companies have the "flywheel effect", APP's first-mover advantage in this niche puts it in a unique competitive positioning


APP's Superior Software

Current Penetration

- Unity has much larger penetration on the DSP side (750,000 apps vs 150,000 for AppLovin)
- This is because Unity has a unique integration where their customers typically automatically integrate their developed games into the Unity DSP ecosystem

Opportunity

- Unity lacks access to first-party data like APP to fuel their recommendation algorithms
 - Their Net Retention Rate is currently 110% compared to APP's 166% (which is 201% excluding non-recurring publisher bonuses)⁶
- Despite the scale of their DSP software, Unity has not been able to drive organic growth at the same rate APP has, which is evident by their NRRs
 - As APP's DSP grows, this discrepancy will be furthered



Thesis Point 3: Market Overreaction to Headwinds



Market Overreaction

App Tracking Transparency (ATT)

- ATT limits the ability for mobile developers to collect third-party data
 - This reduces data inputs, impacts recommendation algorithms, and hurts advertisers' conversion rates

Macroeconomic Headwinds on Ad-Spend

- Investors are concerned about macroeconomic headwinds that is predicted to limit consumer discretionary income
 - This may result in less in-app purchases as well as declining ad spend

Competition from Unity-Ironsource Merger

- APP's competitors, Unity and IronSource, completed a merger in November 2022
- Fearing increased competition from the consolidation of large competitors, the market devalued APP




Overreaction to Potential Competitive Pressures

The market significantly overreacted to the potential competitive pressures from the Unit-Ironsource merger

Merger Concerns

- APP's largest and 4th-largest competitors completed a merger in November 2022
 - The market was concerned about consolidation into one large player ٠
 - Unity also gains access to ironSource's portfolio of apps through SuperSonic ٠



AppLovin vs Unity vs ironSource NRR

APP's Unique Defensive Positioning

- The market priced in this competitive risks without taking into account the unique factors of APP
 - APP has significantly higher Net Retention Rates than Unity and . ironSource
 - APP is also the largest mediation platform (has the largest • integration of different ad networks)
 - Both DSPs & SSPs prefer APP as shown by NRRs and APP's • scale as a mediator
- There is also significant risk in the merger and it will take significant time periods before a successful merger can properly compete with APP

ATT's Limited Impacts

- APP is uniquely protected from ATT due to its limited reliance on third-party data for machine learning recommendation models
- The market discounted APP at a similar scale to competitors that don't have

similar data advantages

Market Overreaction to Macroeconomic headwinds

Investors overreacted to macroeconomic uncertainty regarding ad-spend and its impact on APP

Shift to Mobile

- First, there has been a continued shift towards mobile games as the primary revenue source in the gaming industry
 - Due to lower discretionary income, consumers will shift away from expensive console games to F2P mobile games
 - Larger number of users will offset declining spending



Sticky Product in Fragmented Market

- There are 5.6mm applications on the App Store and Google Play
- The market is fragmented, and a company must advertise for their application to gain traction and user growth
- Even with declining market conditions, NRR for APP was 166% (201% excluding frictions from acquisitions)



Thesis Point 4: Shift to Higher Margin Business




Thesis Point 4: Shift to Higher Margin Business

Software as a Larger % of Revenue

- Software-adjusted EBITDA margins are 65%
 - This is much higher compared to 14% margins for apps
- APP is focusing on growing their software vertical as well as investing less on their applications growth
 - It is expected that in the future, software will make up a larger portion of revenue with declining costs from app-related investments
- Blended margins will be significantly higher than current margins moving onwards, driving significantly higher cash flow for the company

Non-Recurring Costs Impacting S.T. Cash Flow

- APP paid \$200mn in non-recurring costs to transition old customers to a new platform resulting from the MAX acquisition in 1Q22
- Additionally, APP has realized \$100mn in merger costs from the MoPub acquisition (also in 2022)



Valuation



Valuation Summary

Bull Case: 165% Upside

Base Case: 98% Upside

Bear Case: 28% Upside

- Larger TAM and growing market share driving faster Software segment revenue growth
- Stagnant Apps segment revenue
- Long-term blended EBITDA margins at 40%
- Short-term Software segment revenue impacts with long-term growth
- Stagnant Apps segment revenue
- Long-term blended EBITDA margins at 37%
- Slower growth of TAM and stagnant market share driving slower Software segment revenue growth
- Declining Apps segment revenue
- Long-term blended EBITDA margins at 35%

Public Comparable Analysis

Public Comparables Analysis

\$ in millions

Company Name	Ticker	Share Price (actual)	Market Cap	Total EV	EV/Sales (NTM)	P/E (NTM)	EV/EBITDA (NTM)
Unity Software	U	31.57	14,370	14,390	6.3×	132.1×	155.5×
Take Two	TTWO	105.03	18,696	20,035	3.4×	17.8x	13.9×
Digital Turbine	APPS	16.85	1,715	2,082	2.2×	10.9×	7.5x
Magnite	MGNI	9.92	1,435	1,907	2.5×	12.6x	7.5x
The Trade Desk	TTD	47.03	24,364	23,043	14.4×	42.9 ×	37.0×
Maximum		105.03	24,364	23,043	4.4x	32. x	155.5×
75th Percentile		47.03	18,696	20,035	6.3x	42.9×	37.0×
Median		31.57	14,370	14,390	3.4x	17.8x	13.9x
25th Percentile		16.85	1,715	2,082	2.5x	12.6x	7.5×
Minimum		9.92	1,435	1,907	2.2x	10.9x	7.5×
AppLovin	APP	10.68	4,018	6,292	2.2x	36.7x	5.9x

Valuation Summary

Major Drivers

- APP faces headwinds in 2023 but software expansion drives growth in 2023 and beyond
- APP captures market share from both large and small players
 - Blended EBITDA margins expand from 21% to 37%
 - Software (% of Revenue) $(36\% \rightarrow 63\%)$
 - Software margins constant (65%)
 - Apps margins constant (13%)

- **Model Inputs**
- WACC: 11.98%
- Terminal Growth Rate: 2.5%
- Unlevered Beta: 1.99
- Market Risk Premium: 6.94%

Base Case DCF

Discounted Cash Flow Analysis	Year										
\$ in thousands	2020A	2021A	2022E	2023E	2024E	2025E	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E	
NOPAT			27,510	310,308	453,647	631,377	808,743	1,005,930	1,126,190	1,208,176	
(+) Depreciation and Amortization			585,633	339,096	289,068	220,282	186,217	158,496	135,402	116,243	
(-) Change in NWC			(160,684)	3,987	(24,833)	(27,647)	(33,710)	(39,275)	(22,857)	(14,979)	
(-) Capital Expenditures (Including Capitalized Software Costs)			(7,030)	(11,247)	(14,534)	(15,976)	(17,734)	(19,782)	(20,974)	(21,755)	
Unlevered FCF			445,429	642,143	703,348	808,038	943,516	1,105,369	1,217,760	I,287,685	
Unlevered FCF Growth				44%	10%	15%	17%	17%	10%	6%	
Period				I.	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Discount Factor				1.12	1.25	1.40	1.57	1.76	1.97	2.21	
PV of Unlevered FCF				573,430	560,877	575,409	599,989	627,697	617,522	583,108	
Terminal Value										13,918,567	
Implied EBITDA Exit Multiple										8.46x	
PV of Terminal Value										6,302,805	
Enterprise Value										10,440,836	
(-) Total Debt										(3,217,531)	
(-) Preferred Stock										-	
(-) Non-Controlling Interest										-	
(-) Financial Leases										-	
(+) Cash										943,508	
Equity Value										8,166,813	
Diluted Shares Outstanding										378,462	
Implied Share Price										21.58	
Current Share Price										10.90	
Implied Upside										98 %	

Implied Upside Sensitivity Analysis

	_			WACC		
	98 %	11.69%	11.94%	12.19%	12.44%	12.69%
	2.00%	98%	91%	84%	78%	72%
Terminal Growth	2.25%	102%	95%	88%	81%	75%
	2.50%	107%	99%	92%	85%	79 %
	2.75%	112%	104%	96%	89%	82%
	3.00%	117%	109%	101%	93%	86%





Macro Headwinds in the Gaming Industry

- Apple's privacy changes has made it more difficult for advertisers to target users while also raising average CPI (cost per install)
- The reopening of the economy following COVID as well as weaker consumer spending in general has decreased spend on mobile games
 - This has meant lower ad budgets
- However, as aforementioned, APP is more resilient to ATT. So even as advertiser budgets fall, APP remains a more attractive choice
 - Hyper-casual games were up year-over-year, and APP's leading market position as a mediator will be an advantage as these games are ad-based and less focused on in-app purchases
- All players in the industry are affected by this trend, and it is not necessarily indicative of a problem specific to APP

Eroding First Party Data Advantage

- In recent years, management has discussed the restructuring and decreased focus on its Apps business
 - This could erode their first-party data advantage, leaving them more vulnerable to ATT
- However, in the short term, the firm's focus is to run Apps more profitably, improving margins this year from 8% to 17%
 - The firm still treats the segment as a valuable tool, and we expect it to be value-additive (in terms of data collection)
- APP can benefit from the apps' data without having the segment operate as the main business focus
- The integration of MoPub data will also help offset this potential loss of some data

Appendix



Revenue and Margin Build

Revenue Build and EBITDA Margins	Year										
\$ in thousands	2019A	2020A	2021A	2022E	2023E	2024E	2025E	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E
Software Platform Revenue											
Total Revenue Generating Game Application Publishers		29,000	31,030	29,479	28,594	30,596	32,737	35,029	37,014	38,618	39,77
Game Application Publishers Growth			7%	-5%	-3%	7%	7%	7%	6%	4%	
Percent of Publishers >400k in Revenue		7%	7%	7%	7%	7%	7%	7%	7%	7%	
Total Addressable SPECs		2,030	2,172	2,063	2,002	2,142	2,292	2,452	2,591	2,703	2,78
Applovin SPEC Market Share		7%	17%	26%	26%	27%	27%	28%	30%	30%	30
Software Platform Enterprise Clients (SPECs)	146	142	380	531	515	570	629	694	777	811	83
Revenue per SPEC	1,300	1,404	1,634	1,811	1,947	2,161	2,399	2,663	2,885	3,048	3,14
Growth in Revenue per SPEC		8%	16%	11%	8%	11%	11%	11%	8%	6%	3
Total Revenue from SPECs	189,800	199,368	620,920	962,089	1,003,218	1,230,961	1,508,855	1,847,700	2,242,474	2,472,228	2,622,78
Software Platform Revenue	198,305	207,285	673,952	1,016,209	1,059,652	1,300,206	1,593,732	1,951,638	2,368,619	2,611,297	2,770,32
Revenue from SPECs as % of Software Platform Revenue	96%	96%	92%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	95%	9
Apps Revenue											
Monthly Active Payer (millions)	1.0	1.5	3.0	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2
Monthly Active Payer Growth		50%	100%	-21%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	(
ARMAP (actual)	32	41	43	41	40	42	42	42	42	42	4
Consumer Revenue	398,156	739,934	1,458,595	1,181,927	1,067,000	1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,00
Business Revenue	397,643	503,867	660,557	596,235	558,531	558,531	558,531	558,531	558,531	558,531	558,5
Business Revenue Per Monthly Active Payer		0.34	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.1
Apps Revenue	795,799	1,243,801	2,119,152	1,778,162	1,625,531	1,658,531	1,658,531	1,658,531	1,658,531	1,658,531	1,658,53
Total Revenue	994,104	1,451,086	2,793,104	2,794,371	2,685,183	2,958,737	3,252,263	3,610,169	4,027,150	4,269,828	4,428,85
Software Platform as % of Total Revenue		14%	24%	36%	39%	44%	49%	54%	59%	61%	6.
EBITDA Margins											
Software Adjusted EBITDA Margins			71%	65%	65%	65%	65%	65%	65%	65%	6
Apps Adjusted EBITDA Margins			11%	13%	13%	13%	13%	13%	13%	13%	1
Software (% of Revenue)			24%	36%	39%	44%	49%	54%	59%	61%	6
Adjusted EBITDA Margins			25%	32%	33%	36%	38%	41%	44%	45%	4
Adjusted EBITDA			711,613	889,604	898,615	1,059,965	1,251,735	1,485,568	1,757,995	1,916,545	2,020,4
EBITDA Margins as % of Adjusted EBITDA Margins			83%	81%	81%	81%	81%	81%	81%	81%	8
EBITDA Margins			21%	26%	27%	29%	31%	34%	36%	37%	3

WACC Build

WACC Calculation \$ in millions					
Company Name	52 Week Beta	Debt	Market Cap	Debt to Equity	Unlevered Beta
Unity Software	2.80	I,706	l 4,370	11.9%	2.56
Take Two	0.70	3,235	18,696	17.3%	0.62
Digital Turbine	2.92	447	1,715	26.1%	2.42
Magnite	2.79	726	1,435	50.6%	1.99
The Trade Desk	1.90	0	24,365	0.0%	1.90
Median Unlevered Beta					1.99
Median Debt to Equity Ratio					17.3%
Levered Beta					2.27
Risk Free Rate (avg. 10 year govt. bond yield)					3.50%
Market Risk Premium					5.94%
Unlevered Cost of Equity					16.96%
Cost of Debt					7.30%
Weight of Equity					56%
Weight of Debt					44%
Weight of Preferred Stock					0%
WACC					11.98%